Net neutrality is a hotly debated topic. A key point is the treatment of the data by internet providers: as users are a¤ected by the waiting times of data delivery, internet providers have an incentive to o¤er content providers di¤erent priorities. Net neutrality regulation does not allow prioritization. We study the e¤ect of regulation on the incentives to innovate of content and service providers. In the short run, regulation increases content provision at the edge by a fringe, while it decreases the number of applications of a large provider. In the long run, the internet provider adjusts capacity to maintain constant the average waiting time. Regulation leads to lower supply of capacity and overall content, although it fosters entry of new content providers.
Introduction
Net neutrality (NN) is a hotly debated topic. President Obama expressed his views in favour of net neutrality and his government committed to approve a regulation. The UK recently supported a contrarian view, and also the EU decided not to take further measures to guarantee net neutrality. Why such huge di¤erences? First of all because the concept of NN is a bit ambiguous and di¤erent people mean di¤erent things. Secondly, the debate has been mostly led by informal policy reports and advocacy pieces, therefore there is a need to conduct more rigorous analysis to clarify the various issues at stake -within the context of speci…c but hopefully relevant models.
What is network neutrality? Generally speaking, proponents identify it with a set of rules needed to guarantee the openness and freedom of access to the internet, the key elements of the early success of the internet, now possibly jeopardized in the broadband era. Although NN does not have a widely accepted de…nition, it usually refers to a restriction on how ISPs interact with the CPs and end-users. Kruse (2010) categorizes economic relevant meanings of net neutrality in …ve decreasing levels of neutrality. The stricter interpretation interprets neutrality as the identical treatment of every data packet at any router; a slightly weaker de…nition allows for di¤erent prices of di¤erent priorities but an equal price for the same priority; a third interpretation involves the same price for all services but a di¤erent treatment of data packets depending on the internet service provider (ISP) needs for tra¢ c management; a fourth possibility is to let ISPs charge di¤erent prices for di¤erent services within the same data packet priority, allowing a full discrimination. Finally, the maximum breach of neutrality would consist in di¤erent treatment and service for data packets with the same priority. No matter the strictness in the de…nition adopted, the key point seems the treatment of data packets.
In this paper we do not consider vertical integration between the ISP and content providers (CPs). Thus we do not deal with foreclosure issues. Rather, we investigate NN de…ned as a restriction on particular pricing structures and network management techniques, and its implication on investment choices of both ISPs and innovation incentives of CPs.
While the economic literature is scarce, yet there is some relevant work available. In particular, Kim and Choi (2010) and Cheng et al. (2011) develop models where non-NN allows a ISP to charge di¤erentially for access by CPs to its network, according to the priority chosen by the CPs individually. They …nd that non-NN induces higher investment in capacity on the side of the ISP. 1 In their approach, two advertising-funded CPs (CP1 and CP2) have to decide whether or not to pay for prioritized tra¢ c when connecting to a monopolist ISP. A key feature of their models is that end users can see only one CP. This assumption holds both with and without NN. If -say -CP1 opts for priority and CP2 does not, this implies that a end user has to decide whether to see only the content of CP1 (with lower congestion) or only the content of CP2 (with higher congestion), but never both contents. This assumption of "exclusivity"of users to a single CP is needed to provide incentives to CPs to opt eventually for prioritized tra¢ c (as end users will then react, since ceteris paribus they prefer a CP with lower congestion). While this might be a characterization of particular situations where content providers are a substitute between each other (e.g., a subscriber might want to use only one search engine, and will decide, for instance, between either Google or Bing), it cannot capture the fact that most of the internet content has a di¤erent nature, that is, subscribers want to see (and do see) both Google and YouTube, which cannot be modeled as mutually exclusive choices. This is one of the very de…ning features of the Internet: end users can access all the content available. Even in the recent European debate, it was clearly stated that network management techniques, departing from NN, will be endorsed only to the extent that the Internet remains "open". 2 Economides and Tag (2009) do allow for CPs to contact and be seen by all the users. In their analysis, NN or its absence essentially corresponds to a price that the ISP can charge to CPs (under NN, CPs do not pay to be connected to the ISP), but without any di¤erence in the quality/priority of connections o¤ered by the ISP in the di¤erent regimes. In this sense, their analysis is static and their model is not well suited to analyze investment choices. Overwhelmingly, the available literature deals with a monopoly ISP, as we also will. This is perhaps justi…able by the local monopoly that ISPs typically have over the last mile. 3 A contribution that stands on its own is Hermalin and Katz (2007) which considers NN as a restriction on the product line that an ISP can o¤er. The results suggest that any quality restriction is likely to reduce welfare. The paper, however, does not consider congestion and this may explain the result. Canon (2009) consider a slightly di¤erent context: a two-sided market in which sellers trade with both the platform and with buyers. Net neutrality corresponds to the case where the platform cannot charge sellers. As regulation encourages content supply, it has a positive welfare e¤ect.
In our model, we allow all end users to see all the content available, with or without NN. That is, the Internet is always "open" in our model. The 2 For more on this, refer to the statements of the British culture minister Ed Vaizey (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11773574) and Neelie Kroes, slowing down on the need of the EU of new NN rules (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/643). 3 Economides and Tag (2009) also consider, in an extension, a duopoly model of competition between ISPs. In the duopoly model they reintroduce the "mutual exclusivity" between users and a particular CPs, in contrast with their monopoly model (and independently from having or not having NN).
incentive to prioritize or not arises from two sources. First, advertising revenues vary with the level of congestion. 4 Second, the di¤erence in congestion induces the monopolist ISP to change its prices to users. On top of studying the incentive of the ISP to invest in capacity or "core" infrastructure -which is one of the fundamental problems surrounding the debate on NN -we also look at the incentives on the side of CPs. In particular, one characteristic of the Internet is that CPs are very heterogeneous. A few CPs (e.g., google, youtube) generate a lot of tra¢ c (thanks to the numerous applications they provide), while there are many CPs that generate, individually but possibly not in aggregate, little tra¢ c. We capture this by having a large CP and a fringe made of many atomistic CPs. The debate over NN has mentioned the point that innovations are made at the "edge" by CPs. 5 Allegations have been made both that departures from NN may lead to less innovation at the "edge", meaning less entry by CPs, as well as opposite claim of "crowding out", i.e., some applications may actually not develop at all under NN (e.g., applications very sensitive to delays and latency). In our model, we therefore study decisions both at the "core"and at the "edge" by looking at how the ISP invests in capacity and charges for it, in the anticipation of how many applications will be developed by CPs. We …nd that, for a given level of capacity, net neutrality fosters the provision of content at the edge; the overall content available is however reduced in the short run and the only bene…t for …nal users is less congestion. In the long run, the ISP adapts capacity to the congestion. Net neutrality reduces the 4 According to Njoroge et al. (2010) advertising revenues and quality of content are related: consumers have a better experience with high-quality platforms and, therefore, they spend more time online which increases the advertisers' brand exposure; thus advertisers are willing to pay more. Our assumption goes along similar lines as the quality perceived by …nal users depends on congestion in our context. Athey et al. (2010) provide a thorough analysis of advertising in media markets. 5 Sydell (2006) is the …rst to focus the attention on innovation and content supply at the edge; the issue is then more formally analyzed by Bandyopadyhay et al. (2010) , and Kramer and Wiewiorra (2010) .
pro…ts and the investment of the ISP, and still increases content provision by the fringe at the edge but not overall. Both google and the fringe have higher pro…ts with net neutrality. The rest of the paper is structures as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 analyzes it. Section 3.1 considers the e¤ects of regulation in the short run. Section 3.2 deals with regulation under endogenous capacity choice of the ISP. Section 4 conducts the analysis when congestion a¤ects advertising revenues. Section 5 provides a few concluding comments.
The model
Our model consists of a monopoly platform (ISP) that connects users (the Internauts) with the content providers (CPs). The ISP …rst invests in capacity at a cost I( ) which is increasing in . Then it charges the two sides of the market (more on this below; see also Figure 1 ).
CPs pay a connection fee to the ISP since they need a physical connection supplied by the ISP to be on the Internet. This connection allows CPs to contact all available users, whose total mass in normalized to one, and derive advertising revenues from them. The advertising revenue per user contacted is denoted by a. We introduce two sources of heterogeneity. First, there are two types of CPs, a continuum of "small"CPs that we call "fringe"and denote with the subscript F , and one "large" CP that we call "google" and denote with the subscript G. In the fringe, each CP supplies one unique application/content, while google can introduce several applications. Each CP has to pay a development cost for every application it introduces. These costs are also heterogeneous. In particular, …rms in the fringe are distributed along a Hotelling line, with the ISP located at zero. A CP located at x has to pay a linear transportation cost in order to supply its application,
6 If f denotes the connection fee paid to the ISP, then the pro…t of a …rm in the fringe that gets advertising revenues from a total unit mass of users is
A free entry condition determines how many CPs enter in the fringe, namely a mass
Google also pays an entry costs t G per application, but we assume that it can control many applications it eventually introduces along the Hotelling line. That is, google maximizes w.r.t. x the total pro…t
results, however, can be generalized to a generic non-decreasing transport cost.
Hence the mass of applications introduced by google will be
to the extent that the corresponding pro…t
is non-negative. Notice how the connection fee f enters only the determination of the mass of applications from the fringe (2), but not the mass of application (4) from google. This is important as the marginal CP, and hence the elasticity of content with respect to f , is dictated by the very "edge" in the fringe, not by google. Also notice that we allow unit transportation costs t i ; i = F; G; to be di¤erent, in case google has application development costs di¤erent from the fringe. This distinction is introduced to discuss the extent to which a speci…c regime of neutrality can a¤ect the incentives to develop content of more ore less e¢ cient providers.
Congestion
There is a unit mass of consumers that always connect to the entire content available over the Internet. This is true independently of possible prioritization of content; the latter, however, a¤ects congestion. Consumers pay a connection fee p to the ISP. Consumers enjoy variety, which we model by assuming that each consumer enjoys a …xed bene…t v per available application. 7 Consumers also care about congestion on the network. Congestion depends on the total tra¢ c exchanged, as well as the tra¢ c management techniques. We borrow from the extant literature the way congestion is a¤ected by prioritization rules (Cheng et al., 2011; Choi and Kim, 7 It is likely that consumers evaluate di¤erently the content provided by google and by the fringe: the model can be generalized to allow for this.
2010; Kramer and Wiewiorra, 2010) . Each user-CP exchange generates an amount of tra¢ c . Under Net Neutrality (NN), congestion is
which is the waiting time W in a M/M/1 queuing system; the corresponding utility of the consumers is
where d is consumers'sensitivity to congestion. With Priority Pricing (PP), the ISP can o¤er priority to tra¢ c. If a mass
x H (respectively, x L ) of CPs chooses to prioritize tra¢ c (respectively, does not choose to prioritize), the utility of consumers is
where the congestion W (x H ; x L ) is given by the weighted average of waiting times (with and without priority). More speci…cally, waiting times of each type of tra¢ c are
so that the average waiting time is
We note here that this way of modelling tra¢ c implies that the average congestion is the same in the two regimes, for the same capacity level and for the same total amount of tra¢ c exchanged. 8 This is an important property that we must stress: PP, per se, does lead to an e¢ ciency improvement over NN, but just to a reallocation of resources. However, the two regimes will give di¤erent incentives to invest in , and therefore will a¤ect average congestion for an endogenous choice of . Also notice another property of the queuing system whereby, if some capacity is allocated to prioritized tra¢ c, this must imply that, ceteris paribus, the non-prioritized tra¢ c will experience a higher delay. Indeed this is a feature that is emphasized in the debated over net neutrality and that the model can capture.
Advertising
Di¤erences in congestion and priority also a¤ect the pro…tability of advertising rates. This is the mechanism that we introduce in order to give incentives to CPs to eventually opt for priority. With NN, the advertising rate is a for all the CPs, re ‡ecting the fact that all applications are equally valued by users, and they are arrive to the end users with the same congestion probability. Without NN, as motivated by our earlier discussion, there will be di¤erences between the rates a H and a L for the prioritized tra¢ c and for the best-e¤ort content. For now, we do not put additional structure on these advertising functions and simply assume that a L < a H , as tra¢ c with priority su¤ers less from congestion problems. We also additionally assume that
that is, the weighted average advertising rate does not change with and without NN, where the weights are given by the relative degree of e¢ ciency between google and the fringe to generate applications. If both types of CPs are equally e¢ cient, then it reduces to a simple average. This assumption mirrors the previous result concerning the physical infrastructure that average waiting time, when capacity and tra¢ c are the same, does not change with the neutrality regime. Similarly, we now imagine that the neutrality regime, as such, does not alter the total resources (from advertisers) that can be attracted by this economy, but it leads to a redistribution of these resources.
To sum up, we will consider two regimes. With NN, all CPs pay the same fee f , and get a. With PP, CPs will have the choice of paying di¤erential fees:
f L for best-e¤ort and earning a L ; or paying a premium f H for priority and getting advertising rates a H from advertisers. In either regime, we consider a two-stage game where the monopolist …rst sets , then it sets prices to CPs and to end users.
Analysis
We …rst conduct a static analysis, considering capacity as …xed, and compare the welfare properties of the two regimes in terms of impact on CPs, users, and ISP. In Section 3.2, we then consider the long-run investment choice in capacity.
Fixed network capacity
The ISP sets p to extract all surplus (7) from …nal users. Under network neutrality this implies:
In case priority pricing is allowed, the charge to …nal users is:
The CPs subgame is more e¤ectively analyzed by distinguishing between the cases of net neutrality and priority pricing.
Net Neutrality
The ISP pro…ts are:
Substituting expressions (10), (2), and (4) into (12), and di¤erentiating, one gets the following …rst order condition for f :
where only the content of the fringe is a¤ected by f , as
. The …rst three terms corresponds to the marginal revenue from increasing f to (all) the CPs. The last two terms instead capture the adjustment to the consumers'price as a higher f both reduces the content available (which brings a value v to consumers), as well as improving congestion (which is weighted by d). Throughout the analysis, we concentrate only on the case where the ISP …nds it optimal to supply both the fringe and google, instead of extracting all the surplus only from google while neglecting the fringe. This is ensured by having the consumers' preference for variety which is strong enough. 
Priority Pricing
The ISP pro…t function is:
where D L and D H denote the demand for the high and the low priority respectively. Notice that, since a fee is charged per CP and not per application, if the low priority is chosen in equilibrium only by the fringe while google opts for priority, it will be D L = x L and D H = 1: Indeed, the fringe providers opt for the low priority connection if:
9 At the endogenously chosen capacity level that we analyze in section 3.2, this condition
which is always satis…ed when v is high enough.
Provider G can opt for the high priority. The high priority is an option in case
, where the LHS is the pro…t of google with priority, while the RHS is its pro…t without priority. 10 In order to induce G to choose it, the ISP will set the charge for priority such that it holds exactly
Since the pro…t of google takes the value (5), after substitution, this gives:
In other words, the priority fee extracts all the extra rent from google, but it does not a¤ect google's choice of content. Condition (15) to ensure selfselection of the fringe to low priority then becomes:
that we assume to hold. This condition says that google should be "e¢ cient" enough (low t G ), so that any redistribution of advertising resources towards prioritized tra¢ c will induce the ISP to increase the corresponding premium fee more than proportionally, which ensures that the fringe will …nd it too costly to opt for priority. Notice that, when t G = t F ; we can further use the simpli…ed version of (9) , to obtain for (17) a very obvious condition a t G :
To sum up, under condition (17), Google opts for priority while the fringe sticks to the unprioritized alternative. The ISP problem (14) is then:
where (11) and (16) hold. The low priority fee f L is determined by:
where
10 Notice that, with this solution, we are assuming that google takes the dual advertising rates a H and a L as given. In other words, we do not consider that, if google deviates and adopts low priority, then this can induce the advertising market to realize that no CP has chosen priority, and hence advertising rates will fall back to the level under NN.
The short-run e¤ects of NN regulation
To analyze the e¤ects of net neutrality regulation, the equilibrium expressions in the two regimes are compared.
Proposition 1 Imagine capacity is …xed, and average advertising rates with and without NN satisfy (9) . Then the short-run relation between the equilibrium variables in the two regimes is given by:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The results provided suggest that NN regulation has important e¤ects already in the short run. First of all, as far as the connection fees are concerned, a best-e¤ort regime reduces the charge of G while increasing the fee paid by …rms in the fringe. NN thus implies an increase in the participation at the edge, also translating in higher overall pro…ts for the fringe. G gets instead lower revenues from advertising under NN, which implies a decrease in its content supply. Overall, a regime of NN bene…ts the CPs but does not increase overall content provision, given by the sum of x F and x G , which is lower than under PP. Since we conducted the analysis for a …xed level of capacity, this explains the result that there is less congestion and a decrease in the average waiting time under NN.
Moving towards a regime of PP, instead, kills part of the innovation done at the edge by the fringe. They do pay cheaper access fee, but they get a relatively higher penalty from reduced advertising rates. Conversely, google gets much higher advertising revenues which leads it to invest in more applications; however, the ISP appropriates most of these rents with the premium fee, which explains why net pro…ts of google go down.
When the ISP is not able to discriminate, regulation decreases its pro…ts, while overall pro…ts increase under PP. End users always have their consumer surplus completely extracted both with and without NN. The price that they pay typically goes up with PP, re ‡ecting the higher bene…ts they enjoy from more applications. Only if the disutility from higher congestion (due to higher content) is su¢ ciently high, then this result can be reversed.
From a static perspective, the main e¤ect of net neutrality regulation is therefore to direct advertising resources toward the fringe. There is more entry of new content providers in the fringe or, in other words, innovation at the edge, while it kills innovation done by google. It remains to be seen what happens to investment in core infrastructure, but before turning the analysis to this we brie ‡y recap our static results with a numerical example.
Example 1
Suppose that the rate of data arrival, the unit transport costs and the disutility of waiting are normalized to one, so that: = t F = t G = d = 1. Also, the …nal users evaluation is v = 10, which is su¢ ciently high for the ISP to serve all CPs, instead of extracting all the surplus from google alone. The advertising rates are a = 10 in the neutral case, a L = 8 for the best e¤ort and a H = 12 if the CP opts for the priority. Also consider a capacity of = 20:
The net neutral equilibrium is described by the following fee to CPs and price to users:
This is re ‡ected into content supply from the fringe and google:
with a total supply of content equal to x F + x G = 19. With a capacity of 20, the average waiting time is 1. The total pro…ts of the fringe, of the ISP, and of google are respectively:
The non-neutral equilibrium, instead, is characterized by:
that is, the fringe pays less and google pays much more to connect to the Internet. End users also pay more. Content supply from the fringe and google is now:
showing that the reduced fee for the fringe does not compensate for the lower advertising revenues. Google, instead, produces more content as it gets more advertising revenues. The total supply of content increases to
34. This increase in tra¢ c, under the same total capacity, pushes up the average waiting time which is now 1:52.
Google is incentivized to produce more content, but most of the pro…ts go to the ISP via the premium fee. The total pro…ts of the fringe, of the ISP, and of google are: 
Investment in capacity
We now consider the …rst stage of the game. Suppose that the ISP can invest an amount I( ) to expand the capacity of the network and reduce the disutility linked to congestion and waiting times of data packets. Under net neutrality the net pro…ts of the ISP become:
while under no regulation they are:
With simple comparative statics we obtain our next result.
Proposition 2 In the long run: 1) The equilibrium average congestion is always the same under both regimes. 2) When average advertising rates also do not change, the abolition of NN always leads to higher investment in capacity.
Proof. The proof is very simple by doing a change of variable, as choosing also determines W: Under NN it is W = 1 (x F +x G )
; and hence
Applying the envelope theorem, the …rst order conditions are:
These FOCs are identical and thus determine the same average waiting time. This means that
The level of capacity depends on the comparison of total tra¢ c:
Using (9) this inequality can be rewritten as
From the Proposition 1, we know that f L < f and thus N N < P P follows.
Q.E.D.
The …rst part of the proposition is independent of advertising rates. As only the end users care about average congestion, the neutrality regime has no bearing on the equilibrium average waiting time. The neutrality regime instead changes the amount of content provided and tra¢ c generated. To keep the same waiting time, capacity has to adjust too. The second part of the proposition is driven that the fact that, under (9), PP still shifts advertising resources to google, and this produces an overall increase in total tra¢ c, despite the reduction in content supplied by the fringe. Therefore investment in capacity additionally increases compared to NN in order to keep the same average congestion.
Example 2
The results above can be illustrated through an example, where we can also calculate explicitly the equilibrium values of all the other variables. The investment in capacity is expressed by the function I( ) = : Also suppose that, a part from capacity which is now endogenous, …nal users'evaluation, the rate of data arrival, the (identical) unit transport costs, the disutility of waiting, and advertising rates are the same as in Example 1.
In this case, the net neutral equilibrium is indeed characterized by a capacity = 20, which we assumed exogenously in Example 1. Hence, all the same equilibrium values emerge as in Example 1 under NN, with the only exception of the net pro…ts of the ISP that now also account for the capacity costs, and are equal to ISP = 179.
The non-neutral equilibrium is instead characterized by a higher endogenous choice of capacity, = 21. The fees are now
Notice how the ISP now even o¤ers the best-e¤ort tra¢ c for free (this value is optimal in this example, without constraining fees to be non-negative). Content supply from the fringe and google are respectively
Since the content supply of google depends only on a H , it obviously does not change in the short-or long-run. Instead the fee to the fringe decreases now, which explains why its total supply goes up. Also the total supply of content increases to x F + x G = 20. This increase in tra¢ c is exactly matched by the increase in total capacity, and the average waiting time stays at 1. However the congestion of google's applications, with priority, is W H = 1=9, while those without priority have a waiting time of W L = 7=3:
The average pro…ts of the fringe, of the ISP, and of google are:
Thus, in the long-run, only the ISP bene…ts from PP, while google and the fringe are worse o¤. Using the investment I( ) = we can obtain closed-form solutions and characterize the long-run analysis completely.
Proposition 3 Imagine capacity is endogenously determined with an investment cost I( ) = . The long-run relation between the equilibrium variables in the two regimes is given by:
PP leads to a higher investment than NN if and only if
which is always satis…ed when average advertising rates follow (9).
This analysis has developed the idea that PP redirects advertising funds towards google, but diminishes those to the fringe. This typically creates more tra¢ c overall, which leads to higher investment to keep the level of congestion constant. If all CPs are equally e¢ cient in the way they create content, the result is clear: total tra¢ c depends on the average advertising funds available (that we assumed not to di¤er in the two regimes) and on the fee paid by the fringe: this fee goes down under PP, causing total tra¢ c to increase. The result is even stronger in case google is more e¢ cient than the fringe in producing content, while it is diluted when google is ine¢ cient compared to the fringe (t G t F ), yet investment still increases under PP. This result comes from our assumption (9): even when google is very inef…cient, then under NN the advertising rate would be very close to a L and the fringe would not change much its behavior in the two regimes. Instead, google would strictly bring more applications under PP.
Without making any assumption on advertising rates, (21) summarizes the more general condition needed in order for PP to lead to higher investments compared to NN. The condition is certainly satis…ed when the ratio t F =t G is large. It is only when resources, via PP, are directed to the "wrong" type of CP that the result can be reversed. For instance, if instead of (9), one alternatively assumed that a = a H +a L 2 (i.e., with no reference to transportation costs), then (21) would be re-written as
and therefore NN could lead to higher investment when t G > 2t F : In this case google is "very" ine¢ cient compared to the fringe (t G > 2t F ) so that advertising resources under PP are considerably driven away from the smaller but more e¢ cient CPs: the increase in the number of applications supplied by google does not compensate for the reduction of content supplied by the edge of the fringe. We conclude this section with a simple exercise of comparative statics in the PP regime.
Corollary 1 Imagine transportation costs are the same for all CPs. Then, for a given level of average advertising funds available, under PP, an increase in the dispersion in advertising rates leads to an increase in the price paid by …nal users and by google, and a decrease in the price paid by the fringe. Ultimately, the pro…ts of the ISP increase as well as investment in capacity does.
Proof. Recall that when t F = t G (9) reduces to a L + a H = 2a. We now …x the level of a, and look at what happens when the gap between the two rates under PP, i.e., a H a L , widens. From the proof of Proposition 2, when t F = The same e¤ect applies to investment, as
; which decreases. The fee to google is
. The …rst term decreases and the second increases in ads dispersion. However, from (17), it is t < a and hence the second term always prevails. By simple substitution, it is immediate to …nd that the pro…ts of the ISP also increase both in the level and in the dispersion of advertising rates. It is in fact instructive to decompose the e¤ects on total pro…ts: call a H = a+ and a L = a ; where is a measure for dispersion. Pro…ts are made from consumers, with
> 0; from google with
< 0: Investment also changes, with associate cost
That pro…ts increase with the level of advertising funds is not surprising, as the ISP can appropriate more of these resources. More interestingly, under PP, for a given average level of these funds, the ISP bene…ts from an increase in their dispersion. This leads to both more content and more investment. Thus it allows to make more money from the charges to end users, as well as extracting higher premium pro…ts from google. There is also a decrease in the amount that can be obtained overall from the fringe, but the …rst e¤ects always prevail. This is important for the ensuing analysis where we imagine that advertising rates change with the congestion level. The monopolist ISP will have an incentive to a¤ect the level of adverting funds (under both regimes), as well as their dispersion, which is doable only under PP.
Variable advertising rates
We conducted the previous analysis under the assumption that advertising rates were given exogenously, and that, when compared to NN, they would command a premium to those CPs that had chosen to prioritize their applications under PP, and a decrease in advertising revenues otherwise. However, these premiums and penalties arise precisely because, when users su¤er less from congestion problems, the applications they use work better, are more reliable, better preserve data integrity, and so forth.
Lower congestion then should be associated to better opportunities for those who place their ads over the Internet. For instance, smart banners and clips could be integrated with content. Targeted advertising thanks to deep packet inspections allowed by prioritization techniques are another obvious case in point. In this section, therefore, we make ad revenues dependent on congestion, both under NN and PP. In particular, under NN, the (single) advertising rate takes the following general form
Since our focus is now on the link which is being created between advertising funds and network congestion, from now onwards we assume that all CPs have identical transportation costs, t F = t G = t. Google and the fringe are therefore equally e¢ cient in generating content.
As before, we do not assume that departures from neutrality, as such, can increase the resources attracted to this economy. Hence, when average waiting time is the same, then also the average advertising revenues are the same
In order to obtain closed-form solutions, we will work at times with a speci…c example using the following functional form:
under NN, where is the sensitivity of advertising rates to (the inverse of) congestion. Under PP the dual rates are
where represents the relative advantage from advertising revenues when priority is chosen over best e¤ort. Notice that indeed the speci…cation we have chosen preserves two properties, namely that a H > a L and that, if average waiting time is the same, a H +a L = 2a. In addition, this speci…cation has the property that a 0
To set grounds, we start working …rst with this speci…c example, and then turn to a more general analysis. Under NN, the free entry condition for the fringe CPs is still (1). However, with the feed-back e¤ect from advertising rates, the mass of the fringe is now
Notice how the demand from CPs in the fringe is less elastic compared to the case with exogenous advertising rates (it is still @x F =@f < 0; but with
. The reason is simple: when f increases, there are less CPs entering the fringe, but this reduces congestion which, in turn, increases advertising rates. Hence the marginal provider in the fringe is made more price inelastic the higher is . Google maximizes (3), resulting in
In other words, also google considers the impact that its content choice has on advertising revenues. While the fee f does not enter directly the mass of applications chosen by google, it still has an indirect e¤ect since the applications of google and of the fringe are strategic substitutes. Though they do not compete directly against each other, applications cause congestion and reduce advertising revenues to all other CPs, creating an interdependency. Demand from CPs is thus obtained from solving (22) and (23), simultaneously. Due to the reduced congestion from the fringe when f is increased, google supplies more content the higher is f (@x G =@f > 0). Recall instead that, if advertising was insensitive to congestion, then f would have no bearing on google's choice. Under PP, the demand for content is obtained in a conceptually similar way. We omit the details but it is immediate to prove that, as becomes positive, the e¤ects are magni…ed: when f L is increased, google further increases its content. The reduced congestion from the fringe is particularly valuable to google: under a priority scheme, in fact, the increase in advertising revenues due to the lower tra¢ c is larger than in the neutral case and this acts to further increase the supply of google. On the contrary, an increase in the fee for the best e¤ort service hits fringe providers not only directly but also through the indirect e¤ect on the advertising rate, more negative than in the neutral case.
With these preliminaries at hand, we conduct …rst a numerical analysis in the short run using the speci…c functional form. We then turn to a general long-run analysis.
Example 3
A simple example is solved to illustrate the static analysis. As in Example 1, let = t = d = 1, v = 10, and = 20. Now the parameters for the advertising functions are = 9 and = 0:24, that we have chosen for a reason that becomes apparent after solving for the equilibrium.
x F = 7:78
with a total supply of content equal to x F + x G = 15:84. With a capacity of 20, the average waiting time is 0:24. The equilibrium advertising rate is a = + =W = 10, which results in the same (exogenous) advertising rate as in Example 1, thus making the results comparable. Despite the advertising revenues for CPs are the same, in principle, the incentives to provide content are very di¤erent. As explained above, the CPs in the fringe are less elastic with respect to the …xed fee they pay. Google also supplies more content the higher is f . These e¤ects imply that the ISP can charge more on the CPs' side, which reduces the amount of content supplied by the fringe in equilibrium. Google also invests less compared to Example 1, because of the congestion crowding out e¤ect. This explains why the price to end users is lower compared to example 1. The total pro…ts of the fringe, of the ISP, and of google are now respectively: The non-neutral equilibrium, instead, is characterized by:
Contrary to the case with exogenous advertising, now both fees to CPs go up. End users, instead, pay less compared to NN. Content supply from the fringe and google is now:
showing that the fringe reduces supplied content. Google also produces less content, despite getting more advertising revenues. The total supply of content decreases to x L + x H = 15:47. This decrease in tra¢ c, under the same total capacity, pushes down the average waiting time which is now 0:22. The 
Long-run analysis
As in Section 3.2, it is again very convenient to do a change of variable, where the ISP sets prices and average waiting time. Starting with NN, for a given W , we can use almost identically the same analysis as under exogenous adverting rates. The free entry condition for the fringe and google's content maximization determine:
The ISP solves
where p N N is given by (10) , and from W = 1 (x F +x G ) we obtain
The equilibrium is represented by the following two FOCs:
where it is apparent now that congestion depends on the way it a¤ects advertising rates. From (24) we obtain
which has the same form as the equilibrium fee in Proposition 3 when I( ) = . If advertising was not sensitive to congestion (a 0 = 0), from (25) we would also obtain again W = 1= p d. With variable advertising rates, the equilibrium waiting time is de…ned implicitly by the condition
The …rst term is negative, which implies that, compared again to Proposition 3, in equilibrium W < 1= p d. The ISP has now further incentives to reduce congestion, on top of the bene…ts it can appropriate from the consumer's side, because lower congestion increases advertising funds. This is also the reason why the equilibrium value of W is a¤ected by all the parameters of the problem (t; v; , besides d).
Let us now turn to the analysis of PP. For a given W , we have
where p P P is given by (11) , and from W = 1 (x L +x H ) we obtain
We thus obtain
If advertising was not sensitive to congestion (a 0 i = 0) and I 0 = 1, we would also obtain again W = 1= p d. With variable advertising rates, the equilibrium waiting time is de…ned implicitly by
We can now state the following results.
Proposition 4 With variable advertising rates, in the long run: 1) If advertising rates have the same sensitivity to congestion in both regimes, congestion is lower and investment higher under PP compared to NN. 2) If v is large enough, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the abolition of NN to lead to lower congestion and higher investment in capacity is that advertising rates for prioritized tra¢ c are more sensitive to congestion than advertising rates under NN, i.e., ja
In the example, congestion is always lower and investment higher under PP compared to NN. 4) A necessary, but not su¢ cient, condition for congestion to be lower and investment to be higher under NN compared to PP is ja
Proposition 4 makes formal our earlier intuition that the ISP has an incentive to adopt prioritized tra¢ c and invest more particularly when this allows to redirect advertising resources towards google. More in detail, notice that the part 1) of the proposition is not a restatement of Proposition 2 (which is obtained only as a limiting case when a 0 = 0). As advertising rates are now a¤ected by congestion, the ISP reduces congestion compared to the case with exogenous advertising rates, and particularly so under PP compared to NN. PP has a "level" e¤ect that increases advertising funds overall. Part 2) is also quite intuitive. When v is high enough, the e¤ect that prevails must come from the price charged to end users which, in turn depends on total content created. Under NN this is
. This simple comparison tells that PP leads to higher prices and higher incentives to invest if and only if a reduction in congestion leads to higher ads revenues for prioritized tra¢ c, ja A decrease in congestion under PP increases the dispersion of advertising rates, and leads to further funds attracted to google's applications. In this example, both the level and the dispersion e¤ect go in the same direction. Finally, part 4) shows that the result is quite robust. Indeed, it needs quite some reversal in the sensitivity of ads to congestion to overturn the main …nding. In fact, it is a necessary but not su¢ cient result as the level e¤ect, whereby advertising rates increase for google under PP, is still present.
Conclusions
In light of the arguments for and against NN regulation, the debate seems stuck in the sense that, at this point, it is di¢ cult to foresee which archi-tecture will ultimately represent the best approach. The internet seems to be working well to encourage innovation and expansion. However, future demand growth, driven by more content-rich applications, will test the limits of existing networks. The main dispute concerns which of two policy options would generate greater welfare: the protection of innovation and competition in internet content, or the encouragement of greater investment in new capacity.
In an e¤ort to advance the debate, which has mostly been of a qualitative nature, we provide a formal framework which incorporates the arguments of either side. We compare network management techniques with NN, with a focus on innovation. We study the e¤ects on investment incentives of ISP and CPs, and its concomitant e¤ects on consumer and …rms' surplus, and CPs'market participation. Our results suggest that in the short run, regulation increases content provision at the edge by a fringe, while it decreases the number of applications of a large provider. In the long run, the internet provider adjusts capacity to maintain constant the average waiting time. Regulation leads to lower supply of capacity and overall content, although it fosters entry of new content providers. Average advertising revenues of content providers are a key driver of the results: when advertising is a¤ected by the congestion on the network, the results are not as clear cut and conditions are identi…ed under which net neutrality guarantees lower congestion and higher ISP investment. The value of economic models like ours for policy makers is that they help them to work out the balance of the argument between "content"and "capacity"under di¤erent assumptions.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The …rst part of the proof is greatly simpli…ed by operating a change of varibales so that the the ISP chooses the average waiting time W i rather than f i . For a given level of capacity, the fees to CPs can then be easily recovered. Expressing fees as a function of waiting times gives respectively under NN and PP:
For the same level of average W , it immediately follows from (9) that it would also be f = f L . The …rst order conditions with respect to the average waiting times are:
For a given W , as
: Then, the (non-increasing) function F OC N N (W ) takes a lower value than F OC P P (W ):This implies W N N < W P P and consequently also f > f L follows.
Turning back to the equilibrium fees: recall from (16) that
: Calculate (13) at this level of f to get
Since W N N < W P P and in the short-run capacity is …xed, it must be that
As a < a H ; from (4) it also immediately follows that
This is always satis…ed since, from the comparison of the FOCs with respect to the fees (13)-(18), the di¤erence f f L is bounded above by a a L 2 :
Turning to pro…ts, recall that for google
compared to f , it is P P G < N N G : The same reasoning applies to the fringe, both individually and globally, where the total fringe pro…ts are
As far as the ISP is concerned, it is
Under NN, the ISP makes more pro…ts on the fringe.
Compared to PP, the gain corresponds to ; we can simplify (13), obtaining
which is solved to get
This determines the capacity level and characterizes the equilibrium fully:
Under PP, the equilibrium is solved similarly, to get
The results follow from simple comparisons of the relevant expressions. In particular
which, making use of (9), is rewritten as (a H a L ) 1 1 + t G =t F > 0;
and therefore PP leads to higher investment, especially when t G =t F is low.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. The results on congestion follow from comparing (26) and (27) in the two regimes. The only terms that matter are respectively A N N = 3(v ) + t + a 2t a 0 ;
where, to avoid clutter, we have dropped the dependence of ads on waiting time. The results on investment follow from noting that N N = 1 W + t 3a( ) t + v 2t ;
Since a 0 < 0 and a 0 H < 0, a su¢ cient general condition for PP to increase investment is that W P P < W N N . Every single term is bigger in absolute value in A P P compared to the corresponding one in A N N . There is only once exception ( t), but because of assumption (17), which can now be re-written as a > t, this term is more than compensated by a. Hence A P P < A N N , and W P P < W N N and P P > N N : In particular, in this case, after simple substitution, it is Using again (17), then a su¢ cient condition for A P P < A N N is X > 0. It is only when X < 0 that the sign could be eventually reversed. Q.E.D.
